



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Advocate of Peace.

VOL. LXIII.

BOSTON, APRIL, 1901.

No. 4.

THE AMERICAN PEACE SOCIETY,
PUBLISHERS,
NO. 3 SOMERSET STREET, BOSTON, MASS.

MONTHLY, ONE DOLLAR PER YEAR. TEN CENTS PER COPY.

Entered at the Boston Post Office as Second Class Matter.

CONTENTS.	
	PAGE
EDITORIALS	73-75
Difficulty of War under Present Conditions—The Nicaragua Canal Treaty.	
EDITORIAL NOTES	75-81
Harrison's Death—Another Cycle of Tyranny—United States World Politics—Pan-American Exposition—Spencer on Patriotism—A Species of Insanity—Military Dominant—Utmost Amount of Suffering—Revelations of War—Christian Neighbor—Commerce and Peace—Philippine War and Literature.	
BREVITIES	81
GENERAL ARTICLES.	
Open Letter to President McKinley	81-82
Peace, the Conqueror. <i>Poem, Edwin Arnold Brenholtz</i>	82
Philippine War Has Tended to Increasing Degradation	82-83
NEW BOOKS	83-84
New Members	85

Difficulty of War under Present Conditions.

The recent occurrence at Tientsin illustrates, better than any words can portray it, a certain change which has taken place in recent years in respect of the recklessness with which nations formerly plunged into war. For two or three days the world was agape expecting the English and the Russian troops to fall to killing each other over the question of a few rods of railroad siding. A generation ago the incident would have resulted in an immediate fight, and ten chances to one in a direful war between the two great powers. Small as the matter of the railroad siding was, it was just the sort of thing which formerly served as the match which kindled the fire of war. For railroad sidings and the like, be it remembered, were never the real cause of war, but only the occasion which let out the pent-up jealousy, hatred and ambition which had been accumulating and biding their time.

There are several reasons for the present reluctance to let loose the dogs of war. They are not of equal force, but all operative. Some of them are of a moral character; others largely selfish in nature.

The cable and telegraph have a conspicuous influence. When the Tientsin incident occurred, the governments at London and St. Petersburg were at

once in communication. They, looking at the matter calmly at a distance, saw the comparative insignificance of the occurrence, and the immense risks and uncertainties involved in a war. An agreement was quickly reached to withdraw the troops of both sides, and let the whole matter be carefully investigated. This was eminently sensible; but without the wires it could not have taken place. Ten days without intercommunication of the governments would have seen the die cast at Tientsin, and the two nations mad with passion and wildly rushing to war. The wires are great war-preventers.

The frightful risks, financial and political, and the uncertainties as to the outcome of hostilities between powers about equally matched, have an immense restraining force. These uncertainties do not arise so much out of the size of the armies and navies as out of the great expensiveness and deadliness of the machinery of war. Since the events of the South African war, the military experts of Europe estimate that with modern weapons one man on the defensive, in the case of frontal attacks, is equal to about ten on the offensive. Between armies of equal strength there could be, therefore, no decisive engagement, as Mr. Bloch has shown. The Boer war, which has cost Great Britain nearly one million dollars per day, has given a clear idea of the frightful expense which a war between England and Russia, for example, would impose.

The men who handle the war-strings know these things, and few of them are so insane as to plunge their countries into what must in all probability be either speedy humiliation or exhaustion and ruin. Every turn of diplomacy is tried, and national backdowns—straight backdowns, though under some other name—such as no important power would have thought of a generation ago, are becoming increasingly frequent. This fear to go to war is not a very high moral reason for abstaining from it; but it shows at least some remnants, or buddings, of sense, and some consideration for the welfare of the nation.

In reference to one another, the great powers have, in fact, become downright cowards. They are almost mortally afraid to fight one another. Each is anxious, possibly, for some other to make an attack upon him, but not one of them dares to lead in opening hostilities. Russia pounces upon Finland or Manchuria, and imposes the hardest possible conditions; she strenuously avoids tackling England! Great Britain crushes mercilessly to death the little South African